Abstract
Introduction
A digital signature scheme is a method, which allows one party, the signer, to sign messages (documents) in such a way that everyone can verify the validity of authentic signatures, but no one can forge signatures of other messages. The secret key is held by the signer and can't be known by anyone in any way. Unforgeability is the primitive property of digital signature in terms of security.
With information technique development, the mobile/cell phone has become the most widely deployed computing plat-form in the world. Mobile phones present unique challenges not only in terms of user interfaces, battery life, reduced size and so on but also in terms of ensuring secure services to customers from the service providers. Cell phone service providers play a major role in cell phone communications. They provide services for customers to obtain new connections pay charges for the connectivity, obtain additional facilities for the existing connections and so on. These services are executed by the local agents all over the world. Both the service providers and the customers need to be sure that the services are executed by valid local agents. If the local agents misuse the power given or are not performing efficiently, the service provider must be capable of revoking the local agent from executing the services. These issues can be handled by proxy signatures.
As an important delegation technique, the notion of proxy signature scheme was introduced by Mambo et al in 1996 [2] . A proxy signature scheme allows an entity called original signer to delegate his signing capability to another entity, called proxy signer. Since it is proposed, the proxy signature schemes have been suggested for use in many applications [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , particularly in distributed computing where delegation of rights is quite common. And to adapt different situations, many proxy signature variants are produced, such as one-time proxy signature, proxy blind signature, multi-proxy signature, and so on. Since the proxy signature appears, it attracts many researchers' great attention. Based on the delegation type, proxy signature schemes are divided into full delegation, partial delegation and delegation by warrant.
Until now, almost all the proxy signature scheme that has been proposed lacks a formal proof of security. This fact makes many schemes to suffer from different attacks. Thus, a strong proxy signature scheme must be in compliance with the current techniques of public key cryptography, where the security of the protocols is formally proved. In other words, both the capabilities and the goals of an adversary who tries to attack the cryptographic scheme must be clearly stated. Then, the security of a scheme should be proved by reducing a successful attack to solve a computationally hard problem (discrete logarithm, integer factorization, etc.)
Being inspired with the proxy signature problem above, a secure and efficient proxy signature scheme is proposed by combining the short signature scheme with proxy technique, and formalizes a notion of security for short proxy signature schemes. At the same time, we also show that the security of our scheme is tightly related to the k-CCA assumption and inverse computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model [11] . Compared with other proxy signature schemes, it does not need a secure channel. Thus, it is particularly suitable for most unreliable network computation environment. Finally, they show that the proposed scheme has the following advantages (1) the size of proxy signature is an element in group G1 and 160bits; (2) the computation cost of proxy signature's generation and verification is very low, in the signing phase no weil paring operator is needed and in the verification phase, only one weil pairing operator is needed. Thus, the scheme is very efficient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review some preliminary and several complexity mathematic assumptions throughout the paper. In section 3, we describe the formal models of our short proxy signature scheme and a detail instance of short proxy signature is proposed in section 4. In section 5, security and efficiency of our scheme is analyzed. Finally, we draw this paper.
Prelimnaries
In this section, we first briefly review the basic concept and some properties of the bilinear pairings [4] , it is related to the following scheme.
Let use consider two multiplicative group G and 1 G of the same prime order q . And P is the generator of G . A bilinear pairing is a map 
Until now, k-CAA problem is still hard, which means there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve it with non-negligible probability Assumption 3(Inv-CDHP): Inverse Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem is as follows: for an unknown value q a Z  , given , P aP , its goal is to compute 1 P a .
Inv-CDHP is polynomial time equivalent to CDHP, that is, Inv-CDHP is a hard problem.
Definition of proxy signature and its security 3.1. Proxy signature
In general, a proxy signature scheme includes three entities: original signer, proxy signer and verifier. They acts as different roles in the whole protocol.
A proxy signature scheme consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms. Setup: The deterministic generation algorithm that takes as input a security parameter l, and outputs system parameters: param. The original signer and proxy signer produces their secret-public key pair (sko,pko) and (skp,pkp), respectively. Note that, in fact, Setup phase consists of parameters generation algorithm(ParamGen) and key generation algorithm (KeyGen).
Delegation algorithm {DL}: the algorithm takes as the input the secret key sko of an original signer and a warrant W, where the warrant W contains the identity (ID) of proxy signer and, possibly, restrictions on the message the proxy signer is allowed to sign. Finally, output the proxy signing key sp.
Proxy Signing Algorithm {PS}: the algorithm takes input the proxy signer's proxy signing key sp,the proxy signer's public key pkp and the message M, and outputs the proxy signature p  of the message M.
Proxy 
Security requirements of proxy signature
Since Mambo et al. introduced the conception of proxy signature; the security requirements of proxy signature are added continually to satisfy the requirement in different situations. In order to make a proxy signature scheme fairer to the responsibility of the original signer and the proxy signer in many cases. The security requirements of a secure proxy signature scheme are described in the following.
Verifiability: From the proxy signature a verifier can be convinced of the original signer's agreement on the signed message.
Strong unforgeability: A proxy signer can create a valid proxy signature on behalf the original signer. However, the original signer and any third party can't generate a valid proxy signature with the name of proxy signers.
Strong identifiability: From a proxy signature anyone can determine the identity of the corresponding proxy signer.
Strong undeniability: Once a proxy signer generates a valid proxy signature on behalf of the proxy signer, the proxy signer can't deny his signature generation against anyone.
Prevention of misuse: It should be confident that proxy key pair can't be used for other purposes. In the case of misuse, the responsibility of proxy signature should be determined explicitly. Proxy signer's deviation: A proxy signer cannot create a valid signature not detected as a valid proxy signature.
Where unforgeability is the most important property in a proxy signature. It denotes that only delegated proxy signer can generate a valid proxy signature and original signer cannot produce a valid proxy signature on behalf of proxy signer. In fact, unforgeability includes the undeniability and prevention of misuse.
According to the model defined in [12, 13] , we divide the potential adversary of proxy signature into three attack types:
(1) Type I: In this attack type, an adversary AI only has the public keys of original signer and proxy signer. His goal is to forge a signature of a warrant W of the original signer or forge a proxy signature of a message m with respect to the original signer and the proxy signer.
(2) Type II: In this attack type, an adversary AII has the public keys of original signer and proxy signer, and it has also the secret key of the proxy signer. His aim is to forge a signature of a warrant w that he chooses of the original signer. Note that once he can get the signature of a warrant W, he can forge any signature on any message.
(3) Type III: In this attack type, an adversary AIII has the public keys of original signer and proxy signer, it has also the secret key of original signer. Its aim is to forge a valid proxy signature.
Obviously, we know that if a proxy signature scheme is secure against Type II (or Type III) adversary, the scheme is also secure against Type I adversary. In the following security model, we only consider Type II adversary and Type III adversary.
Our short proxy signature scheme
Proxy signature has wide application in reality. In the section, we will propose an efficient provably secure short proxy signature from bilinear maps. The main idea of the scheme is motivated by a short certificateless signature scheme [14] . The scheme consists of the following steps:
Setup of system parameters:
Given a security parameter k, Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of prime order p. And PG 1 is a generator of group G 1 . e is an efficiently computable bilinear map which satisfies e: G 1 G 1  G 2 . Let g=e(P,P), H 1 and H 2 are two distinct cryptographic hash functions which satisfy H 1 :{0,1}*Zp and H 2 :{0,1}* G1Zp. Finally, the system parameters are published as follows: Params={   1  2  1  2 , , , , , , k G G P g H H } Key generation: Given system parameters Params, the original signer A randomly chooses a number sZp as his private key and computes the corresponding public key Po=sP. For a proxy signer B, it also picks a number rZp at random as his private key and computes the corresponding public key Pp=rP. Finally, the public keys P o and P p of the original signer and proxy signer are published.
Delegation phase: To delegate the signing capability to the proxy signer B, the original signer firstly chooses a warrant W. There is an explicit description of the delegation relation such as the identities of the original signer and the proxy signer, the expiration time of the delegation signing power in the warrant. Then the original signer A computes as follows: 1. compute 1 
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 , where A,B denotes the identities of the original signer and proxy signer.
then compute D sQ 
Finally, the original signer sends (Q,D) to the proxy signer by a public channel. Note that the process is executed by a secure channel in many proxy signature schemes, thus, it will increase requirement for system.
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If it doesn't hold, it denotes the delegation will be rejected. Otherwise, proxy signer set Das his proxy signing and keeps it secretly. Generation of proxy signature: Give a message m, to produce a proxy signature on the message m, proxy signer B executes the following steps by his proxy signing key and his private key. 
Security analysis
We will analyze the security of our short proxy signature scheme in this section. Since the proposed scheme is warrant-based, some properties such as verifiability, non-deniablity and prevention of misuse follow naturally. Therefore, we mainly focus on the unforgeability and correctness by the following security analysis.
Correctness
Obviously, correctness of our proposed scheme can be easily verified by the following equation. We only show that the produced proxy signature can pass verification equation. Since 
Unforgeability
In the following, we give security proof of the proposed proxy signature scheme and show that the scheme is secure against two powerful unforgeablity attacks of proxy signature in the random oracle model. The security of the scheme is based on the difficulty of solving the k-CCA assumption. According to the above Table 1 , we know that proxy signature in our scheme has the advantages over that of Huang et.al's scheme and Zhang et.al's scheme in terms of the size of computational cost of generation and verification of proxy signature and the size of proxy signature.
Signature Length. Note that a proxy signature in the scheme above consists of a single group element in G 1 , thus, the size of proxy signature is 160bits. It means that our proxy signature scheme can potentially produce signatures that are as short as BLS signatures [19].
Conclusion
As a special signature type, proxy signature plays an important role in the delegation of right. In this paper, we proposed a short proxy signature scheme based on a certificateless signature scheme. Then the scheme is proven to be secure in the random oracle model and the security of the scheme is related to the k-CCA problem and inverse-CDH problem. To the best of my knowledge, it is a shortest proxy signature. The length of a proxy signature in our proposed scheme is 160bits, since the size of signature only consists of a single element in group G1. Thus, the scheme is the more efficient proxy signature scheme and suitable for low computation mobile device.
